A FIXED-POINT THEOREM FOR DECREASING MAPPINGS

被引：35

作者：

KUKUSHKIN, NS

机构：

[1] Russian Academy of Sciences, Computing Center, Moscow, 117967, 40, Vavilova

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1994年 / 46卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(94)90072-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A normal form game has a Nash equilibrium if all the strategy sets are one-dimensional, each player's utility only depends on his own strategy and the sum of the strategies of the partners, and the best replies are non-increasing.

引用

页码：23 / 26

页数：4

共 9 条

[1] EXISTENCE OF COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM IN LARGE MARKETS [J].

BAMON, R ;

FRAYSSE, J .

ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (03) :587-597

[2] MULTIMARKET OLIGOPOLY - STRATEGIC SUBSTITUTES AND COMPLEMENTS [J].

BULOW, JI ;

GEANAKOPLOS, JD ;

KLEMPERER, PD .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1985, 93 (03) :488-511

[3]

KUKUSHKIN NS, 1993, WPAD9307 I VAL INV E

[4] RATIONALIZABILITY, LEARNING, AND EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES [J].

MILGROM, P ;

ROBERTS, J .

ECONOMETRICA, 1990, 58 (06) :1255-1277

[5]

MILGROM P, 1992, MONTONE COMP STATICS

[6] ON THE EXISTENCE OF COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM [J].

NOVSHEK, W .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1985, 52 (01) :85-98

[7]

TARSKI A., 1955, PAC J MATH, V5, P285, DOI DOI 10.2140/PJM.1955.5.285

[8] EQUILIBRIUM POINTS IN NON-ZERO-SUM N-PERSON SUBMODULAR GAMES [J].

TOPKIS, DM .

SIAM JOURNAL ON CONTROL AND OPTIMIZATION, 1979, 17 (06) :773-787

[9] NASH EQUILIBRIUM WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES [J].

VIVES, X .

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 1990, 19 (03) :305-321

← 1 →