The Effect of CEO Risk Appetite on Firm Volatility: An Empirical Analysis of Financial Firms

被引:17
作者
Belghitar, Yacine [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Clark, Ephraim [4 ]
机构
[1] Middlesex Univ, Accounting & Finance Dept, London NW4 4BT, England
[2] Cranfield Univ, Sch Management, Cranfield MK43 0AL, Beds, England
[3] Middlesex Univ, Sch Business, London N17 8HR, England
[4] Univ Lille Nord France, SKEMA Res Ctr, F-59655 Villeneuve Dascq, France
关键词
Executive Compensation; Stock Options; Risk Appetite; Firm Risk; Financial Institutions;
D O I
10.1080/13571516.2012.642640
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper examines the effect of CEO risk appetite on the return volatility of a sample of large, listed financial firms over the period 2000-2008. After controlling for firm specific characteristics, the results give strong evidence that the CEO risk appetite has an important effect on firm volatility. The biographical measures for CEO risk appetite are significant explanatory variables of all measures of firm volatility employed in this study. The effect of CEO age is significant and positive for all four volatility measures, while CEO education and current job tenure are negative and significant for all four measures. Executive experience with other firm boards has a negative and significant effect on total and idiosyncratic volatility. Interestingly, CEO wealth is complementary to the other biographical variables with a positive effect on all but the default volatility measure. Our results carry implications for shareholders, financial regulators, governments, and managers.
引用
收藏
页码:195 / 211
页数:17
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