THE PHENOMENON OF STATE IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF KANT, HEGEL AND HUSSERL

被引:0
作者
Lavrukhin, Andrei V. [1 ]
机构
[1] Natl Res Univ, Higher Sch Econ, St Petersburg, Russia
来源
TOMSK STATE UNIVERSITY JOURNAL | 2018年 / 436期
关键词
state; freedom; civil society; public law; morality; republic; monarchy; aristocracy;
D O I
10.17223/15617793/436/9
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
The article is devoted to the problem of mutual correlation between individual and political freedom in the context of ethical, legal and political legitimization of the state. The methods used in the study are hermeneutic reconstruction and comparative analysis of the state philosophy by Kant, Hegel and Husserl. As a result of a hermeneutic reconstruction of Kant's state philosophy, four constitutional factors are revealed: the principle of freedom, Republicanism, the principle of membership and legality. Kant makes a distinction between noumenal (moral) and phenomenal (political-legal) freedom, emphasizing that in the sphere of politics and law, nominal freedom cannot become the basis of moral law, since it should not be limited from the outside (heteronomically), but only be relied upon by the individual "from within" (autonomously). For Kant, noumenal freedom is the only right initially given to each person on the basis of his belonging to the human race (natural right). The political community, represented by the state, is authorized only to protect this freedom from external coercion, but has no right to try to restrict internal (nominal) human freedom. Kant chooses the Republic as a preferred form of government, since the law is the final authority. As a result of the comparative analysis of Kant's and Hegel's state philosophy, the author comes to the conclusion that both thinkers are unanimous in understanding freedom as a basis for state legitimization. At the same time, Hegel "removes" Kant's established distinction between nominal and phenomenal freedom and takes as a basis the collective, universal freedom of the state, which embodies objectivity, truth and morality. The highest ideal and duty of the individual is to renounce autonomy in the name of the state, which is defined as a divine end in itself. Hegel uses the ethical strategy of Kant's interpretation of the state and complements it with two others: the understanding of the state as a result of natural teleology (the purpose of nature) and as a result of reasonable teleology (conscious and free choice of a human). Hegel prefers monarchy as a preferred form of government. Husserl, following Kant, develops and consistently radicalizes the ethical and instrumentalist understanding of the state, emphasizing its transitory nature and focusing on the self-realization of a free, phenomenologically reflective individual. However, the freedom of an individual phenomenologist is limited by attachment to the phenomenological and contains rudiments of natural and intelligent teleology in the spirit of Hegel. Although phenomenology, in Husserl's understanding, is neither a "state philosophy" nor a purely personal practice, it acquires the specific nature of intellectual aristocracy: the phenomenological movement and the community of phenomenologists represent the ideal completion of the political history of European humanity.
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页码:82 / 89
页数:8
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