DELEGATED MONITORING AND BANK STRUCTURE IN A FINITE ECONOMY

被引:49
作者
WINTON, A
机构
[1] Finance Department, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jfin.1995.1008
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
When banks act as delegated monitors of borrowing firms in a finite economy, two factors help banks dominate direct lending: portfolio diversification, which increases with bank size, and bank capitalization, which diminishes with size. With free entry into banking, intermediated equilibria are possible even when direct lending cannot overcome autarky. There are usually multiple intermediated equilibria; these may not be Pareto-ranked by bank size, since smaller banks are better capitalized and may Pareto-dominate larger banks. Even when one large bank would be most efficient, assigning a monopoly bank charter to coordinate beliefs on the single bank equilibrium may be unattractive: in some cases, a monopoly bank cannot overcome autarky even though free-entry banking can, and in other cases, the monopoly bank reduces production from the direct lending level. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, L13, O16. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
引用
收藏
页码:158 / 187
页数:30
相关论文
共 23 条
[1]  
BARLOW RE, 1975, STATISTICAL THEORY R
[2]  
BAUMOL W, 1985, NEW DEV ANAL MARKET, P339
[3]  
Bhattacharya S., 1993, J FINANC INTERMED, V3, P2
[4]   FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY-COALITIONS [J].
BOYD, JH ;
PRESCOTT, EC .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1986, 38 (02) :211-232
[5]  
DALTUNG S, 1991, 489 STOCKH U I INT E
[6]   FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND DELEGATED MONITORING [J].
DIAMOND, DW .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1984, 51 (03) :393-414
[7]  
Feller W., 2008, INTRO PROBABILITY TH
[8]   INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE DEBT CONTRACTS - THE ONE-PERIOD PROBLEM [J].
GALE, D ;
HELLWIG, M .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1985, 52 (04) :647-663
[9]   A THEORY OF OPTIMAL BANK SIZE [J].
KRASA, S ;
VILLAMIL, AP .
OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES, 1992, 44 (04) :725-749
[10]   MONITORING THE MONITOR - AN INCENTIVE STRUCTURE FOR A FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY [J].
KRASA, S ;
VILLAMIL, AP .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1992, 57 (01) :197-221