Competition Model and the Change of Local Governments' Behavior-and Governance of China's Local Government Debt

被引:12
|
作者
Li, Shujuan [1 ]
Liang, Yan [2 ]
机构
[1] Shaanxi Normal Univ, Int Business Sch, 620 West Changan Ave, Xian 710119, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[2] Willamette Univ, Dept Econ, Salem, OR 97301 USA
关键词
compete for economic growth; compete for inhabitants' satisfaction; debt governance; local governments' behavior;
D O I
10.1080/10971475.2016.1159906
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Promotion tournament model is used to explain the Chinese economic miracle. The key of the promotion tournament model is competition for economic growth which brings economic growth together with some societal problems. Competition for economic growth influences local governments' behavior and is one of the reasons for the rapid rising of local debts. The article proposes a new competition model-competition for inhabitants' satisfaction. It is a better choice under the system of political centralization with fiscal decentralization in China. It gives inhabitants the right to supervise the government officials while the central government has the power of appointment. Competition for inhabitants' satisfaction changes the local governments' investment and finance behaviors, which is meaningful to improve China's local government debt governance.
引用
收藏
页码:199 / 212
页数:14
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