Subjectivity as the Foundation for Objectivity in Kant and Husserl: On Two Types of Transcendental Idealism

被引:0
作者
Krijnen, Christian [1 ]
机构
[1] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Philosophy, Amsterdam, Netherlands
关键词
Husserl; Kant; neo-Kantianism; Rickert; transcendental idealism; subjectivity; noema; noesis;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
The idea that subjectivity makes up the foundation or source of all objectivity applies to all transcendental idealists. Nevertheless, Husserl conceives of this relationship between subjectivity and objectivity in a radically different fashion than Kant. Husserl's conception leads to a primacy of the noetic dimension of sense (Sinn) at the expense of the noematic dimension. In order to render this explicit, not only a closer look at Kant's transcendental deduction is illuminating but also taking into account neo-Kantianism. In contrast to Husserl, Kant and the neo-Kantians grant primacy to the objective or noematic within the correlation between subject and object or noesis and noema.
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页码:280 / 303
页数:24
相关论文
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