D SENSE-ONLY-SIGNS: FREGE ON FICTIONAL PROPER NAMES

被引：0

作者：

Textor, Mark ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Kings Coll London, London, England

来源：

GRAZER PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN | 2011年 / 82卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

It seems obvious that fictional proper names like 'Sherlock Holmes' are empty. However, if one also accepts that fictional proper names express a sense that determines at most one referent, it turns out to be surprisingly difficult to ensure that they do not refer to real objects. In this paper I will draw on Frege's remarks on fiction to solve this problem. Th e main point of the paper is that the reference of a singular term depends on its sense and the way in which the sense should be entertained.

引用

页码：375 / 400

页数：26