机构:
Univ Melbourne, Florey Neurosci Inst, Level 2,Alan Gilbert Bldg,161 Barry St, Carlton, Vic 3053, AustraliaUniv Melbourne, Florey Neurosci Inst, Level 2,Alan Gilbert Bldg,161 Barry St, Carlton, Vic 3053, Australia
Levy, Neil
[1
]
机构:
[1] Univ Melbourne, Florey Neurosci Inst, Level 2,Alan Gilbert Bldg,161 Barry St, Carlton, Vic 3053, Australia
来源:
EURAMERICA
|
2010年
/
40卷
/
03期
关键词:
evolution;
ethics;
meta-ethics;
Spencer;
Huxley;
D O I:
暂无
中图分类号:
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号:
03 ;
0303 ;
摘要:
One reason for the widespread resistance to evolutionary accounts of the origins of humanity is the fear that they undermine morality: if morality is based on nothing more than evolved dispositions, it would be shown to be illusory, many people suspect. This view is shared by some philosophers who take their work on the evolutionary origins of morality to undermine moral realism. If they are right, we are faced with an unpalatable choice: to reject morality on scientific grounds, or to reject our best-confirmed scientific explanation of our origins in order to save morality. Fortunately, as I show, we have no reason to accept the deflationary claims of some evolutionary ethicists: morality, as we ordinarily understand it, is fully compatible with evolution.