STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND THE STRICT CORE IN A MARKET WITH INDIVISIBILITIES

被引：153

作者：

MA, JP

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, SUNY, Stony Brook, 11794, NY

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 1994年 / 23卷 / 01期

关键词：

individual rationality; Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness; Shapley-Scarf Housing Market; strict core mechanism;

D O I：

10.1007/BF01242849

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We show that, in markets with indivisibilities (typified by the Shapley-Scarf housing market), the strict core mechanism is categorically determined by three assumptions: individual rationality, Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness.

引用

页码：75 / 83

页数：9