INDUCED TECHNICAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS UNDER GREENHOUSE WARMING

被引：17

作者：

XEPAPADEAS, A

机构：

[1] University of Crete, Department of Economics

来源：

RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECONOMICS | 1995年 / 17卷 / 01期

关键词：

TECHNICAL CHANGE; GLOBAL WARMING; DIFFERENTIAL GAMES; TAXES SUBSIDIES;

D O I：

10.1016/0928-7655(94)00005-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The effects of induced fossil fuel augmenting technical change on the global environmental problems associated with the greenhouse effect are examined. The problem is analyzed in a differential games framework. Solution concepts corresponding to open loop Nash equilibrium and feedback Nash equilibrium are examined and compared to the internationally global optimum. Policies in the form of countries' commitment to enter into agreements to contribute resources to global R&D on international tax/subsidy schemes are discussed.

引用

页码：1 / 23

页数：23

共 37 条

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