Loan commitments, asymmetric information and capital regulation : an explanation for the synergy or narrow-banking management

被引：0

作者：

Lin, Jyh-Horng ^{[1
]}

Lii, Peirchyi ^{[2
]}

Chang, Chuen-Ping ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Tamkang Univ, Grad Inst Int Business, Taipei, Taiwan

[2] Tamkang Univ, Grad Inst Management Sci, Taipei, Taiwan

[3] Diwan Coll Management, Dept Informat Management, Tainan, Taiwan

来源：

JOURNAL OF INFORMATION & OPTIMIZATION SCIENCES | 2005年 / 26卷 / 01期

关键词：

Banking; asymmetric information; capital requirement; loan commitment;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

G25 [图书馆学、图书馆事业]; G35 [情报学、情报工作];

学科分类号：

1205 ; 120501 ;

摘要：

We use a two-stage option-based model to study how Asymmetric information, capital requirements, loan commitment rate and the optimal loan rate relate to one another under an uncertain loan loss source. This model shows that there will be synergies between lending and deposit-taking to the extent that both require the bank to hold large liquid asset balances if its term loans and loan commitments are substitutes. Otherwise, narrow banking management is required by the bank. However, if the bank's term loans and loan commitments are substitutes (complements) and the bank conducts strategic substitutes (strategic complements), there is also real narrow banking. Our findings provide an alternative explanation for the synergy or narrow banking management, which answer the question: if there is real synergy (narrow banking), a forced switch to narrow banking (synergy) could lead to a large inefficiency.

引用

页码：143 / 163

页数：21