CORPORATE CHARACTERISTICS, GOVERNANCE RULES AND THE EXTENT OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE IN SPAIN

被引:74
作者
Babio Arcay, M. Rosario [1 ]
Muino Vazquez, M. Flora [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Santiago de Compostela, Santiago De Compostela, Spain
[2] Univ Carlos III Madrid, Dept Econ Empresa, Madrid, Spain
关键词
D O I
10.1016/S0882-6110(05)21013-1
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study examines the relationships among corporate characteristics, the governance structure of the firm, and its disclosure policy. Empirical evidence supporting this investigation has been gathered from a sample of Spanish firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange. This setting is of interest because of its low level of investor protection, high ownership concentration, and poorly developed capital market. Our results show that a firm's size, along with some mechanisms of corporate governance such as the proportion of independents on the board, the appointment of an audit committee, and directors' shareholdings and stock option plans, are positively related to voluntary disclosure. We have also observed that these governance practices are significantly influenced by cross-listings and by the ownership structure of the firm.
引用
收藏
页码:299 / 331
页数:33
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