INFORMATION REVELATION AND PRINCIPAL-AGENT CONTRACTS

被引：2
作者：
ALVI, E
机构：
来源：
JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS | 1988年 / 6卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1086/298178
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：132 / 146
页数：15
相关论文
共 20 条
[1]  
ALVI E, 1986, 864 U AR DEP EC WORK
[2]   EMPLOYMENT WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION [J].
AZARIADIS, C .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 98 :157-172
[3]  
BLACKWELL DA, 1951, 2ND P BERK S MATH ST
[4]   A NEW CLASS OF SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR THE 1ST-ORDER APPROACH TO THE PRINCIPAL AGENT PROBLEM [J].
BROWN, M ;
CHIANG, SH ;
GHOSH, S ;
WOLFSTETTER, E .
ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1986, 21 (01) :1-6
[5]   INVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT AND IMPLICIT CONTRACTS [J].
CHARI, VV .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 98 :107-122
[6]   A NOTE ON OVEREMPLOYMENT UNDEREMPLOYMENT IN LABOR CONTRACTS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION [J].
COOPER, R .
ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1983, 12 (01) :81-87
[7]   WORKER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND EMPLOYMENT DISTORTIONS [J].
COOPER, R .
JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS, 1985, 3 (02) :188-208
[8]   WAGE-EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS [J].
GREEN, J ;
KAHN, CM .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 98 :173-187
[9]  
GROSSMAN SJ, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P301
[10]   IMPLICIT CONTRACTS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION [J].
GROSSMAN, SJ ;
HART, OD .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 98 :123-156
12