Board independence and firm performance: Evidence from Bangladesh

被引:71
作者
Rashid, Afzalur [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Southern Queensland, Sch Commerce, Toowoomba, Qld 4350, Australia
来源
FUTURE BUSINESS JOURNAL | 2018年 / 4卷 / 01期
关键词
Agency theory; Bangladesh; Board independence; CEO; Power; Stewardship theory;
D O I
10.1016/j.fbj.2017.11.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study examines whether board independence influences firms' economic performance among listed firms in Bangladesh. By using data from 135 listed firms on Dhaka Stock Exchange and by using accounting and market performance measures, this study uses simultaneous equation approach to control the potential endogeniety problem. This study finds that, board independence and firm economic performance does not positively influence each other. This study also finds that, board size has significant positive influence on both board independence and firm performance. These findings raise the questions of whether 'one size fits all' type corporate governance practices can be exercised around the world. Bangladesh has imitated the requirement of having outside directors sit on corporate boards to make corporate boards independent and accountable, ignoring the underlying institutional differences. While board independence is an important attribute of corporate board practices in many developed countries, board independence still may be an illusion in Bangladesh. (C) 2017 Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, Future University. Production and Hosting by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:34 / 49
页数:16
相关论文
共 106 条
  • [1] Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate performance
    Adams, RB
    Almeida, H
    Ferreira, D
    [J]. REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2005, 18 (04) : 1403 - 1432
  • [2] Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance
    Adams, Renee B.
    Ferreira, Daniel
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2009, 94 (02) : 291 - 309
  • [3] Anderson RC, 2004, ADMIN SCI QUART, V49, P209
  • [4] Agency costs and ownership structure
    Ang, JS
    Cole, RA
    Lin, JW
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2000, 55 (01) : 81 - 106
  • [5] [Anonymous], 2003, FRB NEW YORK EC POLI
  • [6] Asian Development Bank. J.W, 2000, CONS REP, V1
  • [7] Bacidore J. M., 1997, FINANC ANAL J, V53, P11
  • [8] Barney J. B, 1990, ACAD MANAGE REV, V15, P382
  • [9] Bathala C.T., 1995, MANAG DECIS ECON, V16, P59, DOI DOI 10.1002/MDE.4090160108
  • [10] Baysinger Barry D., 1985, J LAW ECON ORGAN, V1, P215, DOI 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036883