共 22 条
[21]
1973, REPORTS CONDITION IN
[22]
1988, SENIOR LOAN OFFICER
LOAN COMMITMENTS AND BANK RISK EXPOSURE
被引：65
作者：
AVERY, RB
BERGER, AN
机构：
[1] FED RESERVE BOARD,MONETARY & FINANCIAL STUDIES SECT,20TH & C ST NW,WASHINGTON,DC 20551
[2] FED RESERVE SYST,BOARD GOVERNORS,WASHINGTON,DC 20551
[3] CORNELL UNIV,ITHACA,NY 14853
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0378-4266(91)90045-N
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
Loan commitments increase a bank's risk by obligating it to issue future loans under terms it might otherwise refuse. However, moral hazard and adverse selection problems may result in these contracts being rationed or sorted. Depending on the relative risks of the borrowers who do and do not receive commitments, commitment loans could be safer or riskier on average than other loans. The empirical results indicate that commitment loans tend to have slightly better than average performance, suggesting that either commitments generate little risk or that this risk is offset by the selection of safer borrowers to receive commitments. © 1991.
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页码：173 / 192
页数：20
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