ATTRIBUTION OF COGNITIVE STATES TO ANIMALS - ANTHROPOMORPHISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Subjects were asked to indicate the likelihood that each of 30 animals (chosen as exemplars of the major phylogenetic classes) could engage in three complex cognitive tasks. Subjects were also asked to rate the extent to which they felt each animal was similar to themselves and whether they felt the animal experienced the world in a manner similar to the way they experienced it. The results showed that in all cases the perceived similarity and inferred cognitive abilities of animals proceeded from lesser to greater in the following order: invertebrates, fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, mammals (excluding dogs, cats, and primates). For pets (dogs and cats) and primates, there was a marked increase in perceived similarity and in the tendency to make attributions about complex cognitive characteristics. The data are discussed in the context of viewing anthropomorphism as a derivative of our ability to infer the mental states of conspecifics-an ability that evolved as a consequence of the need to take into account the experience and intentions of other humans. Although we routinely generalize this capacity to species other than our own, the evidence that the effects are reciprocal is extremely limited.