SUBJECT RESPONSE TO LOSS IN AN EXPERIMENTAL TOURNAMENT

被引:3
作者
DRAGO, R
HEYWOOD, JS
机构
[1] University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0165-1765(91)90200-5
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We present tests for the influence of losing on subsequent behavior in a nongame tournament experiment. The results are uniformly insignificant, suggesting non-convex incentives, such as tournaments or quotas, do not cause suboptimal behavior among losers as has been asserted. © 1991.
引用
收藏
页码:371 / 374
页数:4
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