Influence of Context on Player Behavior: Experimental Assessment

被引:4
作者
Farolfi, Stefano [1 ]
Desole, Mathieu [2 ]
Rio, Patrick [3 ]
机构
[1] G Eau, CIRAD, Breton, France
[2] SupAgro, LAMETA, Montpellier, France
[3] INRA, LAMETA, Paris, France
关键词
communication; context of a game; contextual influence; Cooperative Game Theory; coordination; effect of context; experience; experiment; focal point; illustration; noise; player choice; players' behavior; predictions; repetition; water;
D O I
10.1177/1046878114563647
中图分类号
G40 [教育学];
学科分类号
040101 ; 120403 ;
摘要
Background. This article explores the causal effect of context on players' behavior by using a game based on Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) modified into a coordination experiment. Aims. This article has two aims: first, to suggest an analytical framework focusing on four attributes (Repetition, Illustration, Communication, and Experience) representative of the game's context; and, second, to use an experimental protocol based on this framework to test hypotheses on how context influences players' choices. Results. A focal point, different from the expected outcome, emerged in the baseline treatment. In non-repeated treatments, the combination of Illustration and Communication modified the players' choices observed in the absence of these attributes. However, when tested separately, only Communication proved able to guide players' choices toward theoretical predictions. When Repetition was introduced, the learning effect was clear in all treatments and both Communication and Illustration produced a dispersion of results. Moreover, Illustration proved to be complementary to Communication in facilitating players' choices in line with theoretical predictions. Conclusion. These results are preliminary outcomes of a pilot experimental assessment, but have a potential interest in terms of the priorities to be followed when choosing the contextual components constituting an experimental protocol or a game platform.
引用
收藏
页码:627 / 665
页数:39
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