Top Management Team Characteristics and Accrual-Based Earnings Management

被引:26
作者
Hsieh, Yu-Ting [1 ]
Chen, Tsung-Kang [2 ]
Tseng, Yi-Jie [3 ]
Lin, Ruey-Ching [3 ]
机构
[1] Natl Cheng Kung Univ, Dept Accountancy, Tainan, Taiwan
[2] Natl Chiao Tung Univ, Dept Management Sci, Hsinchu, Taiwan
[3] Fu Jen Catholic Univ, Dept Accounting, New Taipei, Taiwan
关键词
Top management team knowledge; Average tenure; Earnings management;
D O I
10.1016/j.intacc.2018.11.004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study examines how top management team (TMT) knowledge and average tenure affect accrual-based earnings management by investigating 4791 Taiwanese listed companies from 2006 to 2010. TMT members with more knowledge (higher education level, more accounting expertise, and greater prior top management experience) and longer average tenure have better performances and higher reputations, and are more aware of the litigation costs of earnings manipulations; therefore, they reduce managers' incentives to manage earnings (incentive-reduction effect). On the other hand, these TMT members are also likely to become entrenched and engage in more earnings manipulations (entrenchment-enhancing effect). The empirical results show that firms' TMT knowledge and average tenure are negatively associated with discretionary accruals, suggesting that the incentive-reduction effect is stronger than the entrenchment-enhancing effect, which makes TMT members less likely to engage in earnings management. Moreover, the above results are robust when employing different earnings management measures and suspect firm analyses, as well as considering endogeneity issues. Finally, the study suggests that the presence of a founding family may reduce the influences of TMT knowledge and average tenure on earnings management.
引用
收藏
页码:314 / 334
页数:21
相关论文
共 50 条
[41]   Abnormal audit fees and accrual and real earnings management: evidence from UK [J].
Alhadab, Mohammad .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL REPORTING AND ACCOUNTING, 2018, 16 (03) :395-416
[42]   The effect of corruption on the level of real and accrual earnings management in cases of target firms [J].
Christopoulos, Apostolos ;
Dokas, Ioannis ;
Leontidis, Christos ;
Spyromitros, Eleftherios .
EUROMED JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 2022, :575-603
[43]   Top management team stability and debt concentration [J].
Yao, Wenyun ;
Yang, Hang ;
Shi, Xiulian ;
Song, Zilong .
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS, 2024, 91
[44]   The Effect of the Directorate Characteristics on Earnings Management Based on Chinese Market Data [J].
Zhang Yuemei ;
Li Yanxi .
2007 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, NETWORKING AND MOBILE COMPUTING, VOLS 1-15, 2007, :3985-3988
[45]   Management of the loss reserve accrual and the distribution of earnings in the property-casualty insurance industry [J].
Beaver, WH ;
McNichols, MF ;
Nelson, KK .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2003, 35 (03) :347-376
[46]   Can enterprise green transformation inhibit accrual earnings management? Evidence from China [J].
Lei, Yufei ;
Yan, Yucong ;
Chen, Chen ;
Luo, Tianyao ;
Wang, Yingdong ;
Wu, Hao .
HELIYON, 2024, 10 (01)
[47]   Do CEO characteristics affect earnings management? [J].
Putra, Adhitya Agri ;
Setiawan, Doddy .
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS IN SOCIETY, 2024, 24 (05) :1137-1155
[48]   Board characteristics and earnings management in Sri Lanka [J].
Rajeevan, Shanmugavel ;
Ajward, Roshan .
JOURNAL OF ASIAN BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2020, 27 (01) :2-18
[49]   Board Chairman Characteristics and Real Earnings Management [J].
Al-Absy, Mujeeb Saif Mohsen .
SUSTAINABILITY, 2022, 14 (22)
[50]   Earnings Management Based on Game Theory [J].
Zhang Ming-xia .
PROCEEDINGS OF 2010 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (6TH), VOL II, 2010, :934-938