STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY, EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION, AND COORDINATION FAILURE IN AVERAGE OPINION GAMES

被引：227

作者：

VANHUYCK, JB ^{[1
]}

BATTALIO, RC ^{[1
]}

BEIL, RO ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] AUBURN UNIV,AUBURN,AL 36849

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2937932

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：885 / 910

页数：26

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