EFFECTS OF MONITORING AND TRADITION ON COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS - AN EXPERIMENT WITH PRINCIPAL-AGENT DYADS

被引：13

作者：

CONLON, EJ ^{[1
]}

PARKS, JM ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV MINNESOTA,CTR IND RELAT,MINNEAPOLIS,MN 55455

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/256583

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：603 / 622

页数：20

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