Memory culture and historical politics in today's Russia

Considering that other countries are still conducting their studies, it is too early to make conclusions and summarise the question of Russia's memory culture and historical politics. However, it is possible to share some insights concerning this topic: (1) This analysis indicates that Russia's case is in stark contrast to the opinions of those theorists who negate the existence of national memory culture. In Russia, this culture began to materialise in 2005, after the complicated period of post-Soviet transformation. What became central was the narrative of the empire (derzhava), whose status should also be recognised by the rest of the world. The main symbolical resource used in the construction of the motif of powerful Russia is a myth of victory in the Great Patriotic War. More recently, however, this general myth has been strengthened by selected facts from other historical periods. (2) Symbolical figures of Russia's memory culture - both those developing and those already formed - are continuously reinterpreted. Since 1992 the myth of victory has undergone a few stages of transformation: the first years of Boris Yeltsin's presidency (until 1995) were dominated by active efforts to deconstruct this myth; in the period between 1995 and 2000 it was restored, with a particular stress put on the status of Russian people as the unconquered victim; in 2000-2005, the State regained its vital place in the structure of the myth. Recently, the myth has been instrumentalised and used as an argument in Russia's confrontation with the West. The period since 2011 has seen a noticeable increase in attempts to expand the symbolic instrumentarium through active use of selected facts from other historical periods. (3) Although what dominates in Russia is the imperial mega narrative (derzhava), there is also an alternative stream that makes a substantial opposition - the myth of a victim. The years 2009-2013 have shown us that the memory of Stalin's crimes is really strong. In this sense, the structure of memory in Russia, although with some exceptions, is comparable to the Polish one. On the other hand, substantial differences are noticed in comparison with Germany, Lithuania or Belarus. Those countries have only one memory culture, although with different topics included in the content. Ukraine remains beyond the regional context: even though the process of forming a single policy of remembrance is in place, it is only in its initial phase.