The article discusses the issue of rethinking and clarifying of the concept of responsibility in the ethical legal discourse. Who do we call responsible? What are we responsible for and before whom? What is the essence and the basis of our responsibilities? The semantic field of the concept of responsibility is expanded in the article. The connection of responsibility with the concept of imputation demonstrates the need to define the subject of responsibility. An option of moral responsibility justification in terms of causal theories is considered. It is shown that the problems of determining of moral responsibility and imputation become apparent at the intersection of ethical and legal discourses. Imputation of guilt, especially in criminal law, requires not only the establishment of the subject, the perpetrator, but also the determination of his/her motives. The philosophically known problem connected with the impossibility of determining "alien consciousness" may well result in theoretical skepticism. In addition, if a motive is interpreted as a cause of action, there is an evident error in reasoning: a motive can be learnt from a description of action, but the way action is described already contains an indication of the motive which only requires finding. In civil law, on the contrary, the expansion of the concept of responsibility and virtual disappearance of the concept of guilt are observed. This fact leads to removal of the subject of moral responsibility. It seems that the main problem is to determine legal responsibility based on actions already committed. Consequentialism also assumes focus on a result. This shows certain difficulties of evidentiary support of the causal approach in the ethical legal environment and demonstrates the inapplicability of consequentialism as a basis for the formulation of universal moral principles.
