Principal-agent theory in complex operations

被引:6
|
作者
Coletta, Damon [1 ]
机构
[1] US Air Force Acad, Dept Polit Sci, Colorado Springs, CO 80840 USA
来源
SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES | 2013年 / 24卷 / 02期
关键词
Principal-agent; international community; complex operations; Afghanistan;
D O I
10.1080/09592318.2013.778016
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
Originally developed for identifying costs of coordination between labor and management in economics, principal-agent theory challenged traditional explanations for friction in political relations, especially in a democracy, between elected officials and the permanent bureaucracy. Not without controversy, the approach recasts democratic civil-military relations, featuring as agent a unique, military 'bureaucrat' refining goals of the state, a role normally assigned to the principal. At the same time, principal-agent applications reached international institutions as a collective actor in their own right. Drawing from civil-military relations and international institutions, this article poses still greater expansion for principal-agent dynamics. Principal-agent theory offers significant promise in complex international operations mixing inter-state, state, sub-state, and nongovernmental organizations because it clearly delineates culturally bounded normative arguments from resource-based logics; it also suggests moves such as building flexible membership institutions ahead of time to improve cooperation among international actors during the next crisis.
引用
收藏
页码:306 / 321
页数:16
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