INTERLINKAGE;
TIME PREFERENCE;
SHARE CROPPING;
CREDIT CONTRACTS;
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION;
D O I:
10.1016/0167-2681(95)00017-5
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
The paper explores the nature of interlinked contract under adverse selection where agents intertemporal preferences are private information. Our principal findings are: (a) More patient agents (with low rates of time preferences) are offered credit contracts and others are offered share and credit contracts (i.e. interlinked contracts). (b) Interlinkage of contracts reduces investment (c) and is second-best and the non interlinked contracts is first-best.
机构:
Harvard Univ, John F Kennedy Sch Govt, 79 John F Kennedy St, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAHarvard Univ, John F Kennedy Sch Govt, 79 John F Kennedy St, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Bradt, Jacob T.
Kousky, Carolyn
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机构:
Univ Penn, Wharton Risk Ctr, 3819 Chestnut St,Suite 130, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USAHarvard Univ, John F Kennedy Sch Govt, 79 John F Kennedy St, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Kousky, Carolyn
Wing, Oliver E. J.
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机构:
Univ Bristol, Sch Geog Sci, Bristol BS8 1SS, Avon, EnglandHarvard Univ, John F Kennedy Sch Govt, 79 John F Kennedy St, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
机构:
New York Univ Abu Dhabi, POB 129188, Abu Dhabi, U Arab EmiratesNew York Univ Abu Dhabi, POB 129188, Abu Dhabi, U Arab Emirates
Dariel, Aurelie
Riedl, Arno
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机构:
Maastricht Univ, Netspar, IZA, CESifo, POB 616, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands
Maastricht Univ, Dept Microecon & Publ Econ, POB 616, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, NetherlandsNew York Univ Abu Dhabi, POB 129188, Abu Dhabi, U Arab Emirates
Riedl, Arno
Siegenthaler, Simon
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h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Texas Dallas, Naveen Jindal Sch Management, Richardson, TX 75080 USANew York Univ Abu Dhabi, POB 129188, Abu Dhabi, U Arab Emirates