REFERENDUM, INITIATIVE, AND VETO POWER - BUDGETARY DECISION-MAKING IN LOCAL-GOVERNMENT

被引：21

作者：

STEUNENBERG, B

机构：

[1] UNIV TWENTE,FAC PUBL ADM & PUBL POLICY,DEPT ECON,7500 AE ENSCHEDE,NETHERLANDS

[2] UNIV MARYLAND,DEPT ECON,COLL PK,MD 20742

[3] GEORGE MASON UNIV,CTR STUDY PUBL CHOICE,FAIRFAX,VA 22030

来源：

KYKLOS | 1992年 / 45卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1467-6435.1992.tb02757.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The paper examines the influence of different institutional arrangements of representative government. Mom specifically, the effects of (1) obligatory fiscal referendum (2) voter initiative, and (3) veto power of an elected official of the executive branch (for instance, the mayor) on the level of expenditure am analyzed. Moreover, the influence of agenda setting power of bureaucracy on outcomes is compared with a case in which the legislature is able to introduce amendments.

引用

页码：501 / 529

页数：29

共 15 条

[1]

BLACK D, 1987, THEORY COMMITTEES EL

[2]

CHICOINE DL, 1989, PUBLIC FINANC, V44, P225

[3] THE IMPACT OF CITIZEN INFLUENCE ON LOCAL-GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE [J].