CONSISTENT SOLUTIONS IN ATOMLESS ECONOMIES

被引：20

作者：

THOMSON, W ^{[1
]}

ZHOU, L ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] YALE UNIV,COWLES FDN,NEW HAVEN,CT 06520

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1993年 / 61卷 / 03期

关键词：

CONSISTENCY; ATOMLESS ECONOMY; SATIATED PREFERENCES; EQUAL-BUDGET WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM; STRICTLY ENVY-FREE ALLOCATION;

D O I：

10.2307/2951718

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider the problem of allocating a bundle of commodities among a group of agents who are collectively entitled to them. We prove: For an atomless economy with possibly satiated preferences, any solution that is efficient, equitable, and consistent must select allocations that are supported by equal-budget Walrasian equilibria with slack.

引用

页码：575 / 587

页数：13

共 26 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 1990, GAME THEORY APPL

[2] GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF A BANKRUPTCY PROBLEM FROM THE TALMUD [J].