UNINFORMED CUSTOMERS AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION - MODELING CONTRACT FAILURE THEORY

被引：15
|
作者：
CHILLEMI, O [1 ]
GUI, B [1 ]
机构：
[1] UNIV TRIESTE,I-34127 TRIESTE,ITALY
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1991年 / 35卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0165-1765(91)90095-3
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
When product quality is unobservable before purchase, the equilibrium price may be inefficiently high in order to signal high quality. We present a reputation model where under reasonable assumption nonprofit organizations can credibly charge lower prices than for-profit organizations. © 1991.
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页码：5 / 8
页数：4
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