Game-theoretic analysis of international development assistance regimes

被引：0

作者：

Degterev, D. A. ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] MGIMO Univ, Minist Foreign Affairs Russia, Econ Sci, Moscow, Russia

[2] MGIMO Univ, Minist Foreign Affairs Russia, Dept World Econ, Moscow, Russia

来源：

MGIMO REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS | 2011年 / 05期

关键词：

International Development Assistance; Game Theory; Principal-Agent Model; Samaritan's Dilemma; Stackelberg Model; Nash Equilibrium; Utility function; International Aid and Corruption;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

D81 [国际关系];

学科分类号：

030207 ;

摘要：

This article analyzes the different conflict of interest situations that arise in international development cooperation. The most popular theoretical concepts are given, including Principal-Agent Model, Samaritan's Dilemma, the Utility function in the presence of several donor and recipient, as well as in the situation of "donor-recipient-contractor" interactions. These models are considered in terms of game-theoretic approach and are illustrated by a series of actual examples. Game theory allows us to understand the underlying motivations of various actors of international development assistance regimes, that is especially important today as the Russian global policy of international assistance is shaped.

引用

页码：59 / 66

页数：8

共 26 条

[1]

ALCHIAN AA, 1972, AM ECON REV, V62, P777

[2]

[Anonymous], 2011, DEV AID INCR WORR TR

[3]

Azam J- P., 2000, CONTRACTING AI UNPUB

[4]

Bauer P., 1971, EC UNDER DEV COUNTRI

[5] CAN THEY GET ALONG WITHOUT US - SUSTAINABILITY OF DONOR-SUPPORTED HEALTH PROJECTS IN CENTRAL-AMERICA AND AFRICA [J].

BOSSERT, TJ .

SOCIAL SCIENCE & MEDICINE, 1990, 30 (09) :1015-1023

[6]

Buchanan J., 1977, FREEDOM CONSTITUTION, P169

[7]

CATTERSON J, 1999, SUSTAINABILITY ENIGM

[8]

DEGTEREV DA, 2009, MEZHDUNARODNYYE PROT, V2

[9]

DEGTEREV DA, 2011, MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA M

[10]

DEGTEREV DA, 2011, VESTNIK MGIMO U

← 1 2 3 →