OPTIMAL INFORMATION ACQUISITION FOR HETEROGENEOUS DUOPOLY FIRMS

被引:37
作者
HWANG, HS
机构
[1] Department of Economics, Texas A and M University, College Station
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeth.1993.1024
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper analyzes a stochastic duopoly market in which heterogenous firms acquire costly information about the stochastic market demand prior to their production decisions. The equilibrium amounts of information acquired by each firm are compared. The comparative statics analyses show the differential effects of a change in information cost, the degree of uncertainty in the market demand, and the demand and cost function parameters. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, L13, L15. © 1993 Academic Press, Inc.
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收藏
页码:385 / 402
页数:18
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