The impacts of SOX and SEC investigation on the corporate governance of option backdating firms

被引：3

作者：

Chang, Jui-Chin ^{[1
]}

Tang, Alex P. ^{[2
]}

Krivogorsky, Victoria ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Texas A&M Univ, Sch Business, Div Int Banking & Finance Studies, 5201 Univ Blvd, Laredo, TX 78041 USA

[2] Morgan State Univ, Sch Business & Management, Dept Accounting & Finance, Baltimore, MD 21251 USA

[3] San Diego State Univ, Charles W Lamden Sch Accountancy, San Diego, CA 92182 USA

来源：

ADVANCES IN ACCOUNTING | 2011年 / 27卷 / 02期

关键词：

Options backdating; Corporate governance; SOX; CEO compensation;

D O I：

10.1016/j.adiac.2011.05.004

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This study investigates the combined impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the subsequent related Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) initiatives on the corporate governance characteristics of firms that had historically backdated stock options. Our results show that backdating firms had both weaker board-level and committee-level corporate governance characteristics than control firms in the pre-SOX period. In contrast, backdating firms dress up their board-level governance to meet regulatory requirements but still feature weaker committee-level corporate governance in the post-SOX era. (C) 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

引用

页码：205 / 212

页数：8

共 23 条

[1] Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate performance [J].