REPUTATION IN BARGAINING AND DURABLE GOODS MONOPOLY

[1] AUSUBEL L, 1989, IN PRESS J EC THEORY

[2] AUSUBEL L, 1988, UNPUB GENERALIZATION

[3] ONE IS ALMOST ENOUGH FOR MONOPOLY [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1987, 18 (02) : 255 - 274

[4] DURABLE GOOD MONOPOLIES WITH RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS AND REPLACEMENT SALES [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1984, 15 (03) : 336 - 345

[5] DURABLE-GOODS MONOPOLISTS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1982, 90 (02) : 314 - 332

[6] DURABILITY AND MONOPOLY [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1972, 15 (01) : 143 - 149

[7] SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1983, 50 (02) : 221 - 247

[8] Fudenberg D., 1985, GAME THEORETIC MODEL

[9] FOUNDATIONS OF DYNAMIC MONOPOLY AND THE COASE CONJECTURE [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1986, 39 (01) : 155 - 190

[10] NONCOOPERATIVE COLLUSION IN DURABLE GOODS OLIGOPOLY [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1987, 18 (02) : 248 - 254

[1] AUSUBEL L, 1989, IN PRESS J EC THEORY

[2] AUSUBEL L, 1988, UNPUB GENERALIZATION

[3] ONE IS ALMOST ENOUGH FOR MONOPOLY [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1987, 18 (02) : 255 - 274

[4] DURABLE GOOD MONOPOLIES WITH RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS AND REPLACEMENT SALES [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1984, 15 (03) : 336 - 345

[5] DURABLE-GOODS MONOPOLISTS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1982, 90 (02) : 314 - 332

[6] DURABILITY AND MONOPOLY [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1972, 15 (01) : 143 - 149

[7] SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1983, 50 (02) : 221 - 247

[8] Fudenberg D., 1985, GAME THEORETIC MODEL

[9] FOUNDATIONS OF DYNAMIC MONOPOLY AND THE COASE CONJECTURE [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1986, 39 (01) : 155 - 190

[10] NONCOOPERATIVE COLLUSION IN DURABLE GOODS OLIGOPOLY [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1987, 18 (02) : 248 - 254