THE STRUCTURE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH FINITE AUTOMATA

被引：214
作者：
ABREU, D
RUBINSTEIN, A
机构：
[1] HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM,DEPT ECON,JERUSALEM,ISRAEL
[2] MATH SCI RES INST,BERKELY,CA
来源：
ECONOMETRICA | 1988年 / 56卷 / 06期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/1913097
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：1259 / 1281
页数：23
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