MONITORING AND REPUTATION - THE CHOICE BETWEEN BANK LOANS AND DIRECTLY PLACED DEBT

被引：1236

作者：

DIAMOND, DW

机构：

来源：

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 1991年 / 99卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/261775

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

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页码：689 / 721

页数：33

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