COMPETENCE, AND OTHER CONSTRUCTS, IN RIGHT-TO-DIE CASES

Subjects had to make a ''remove'' or ''do not remove'' life-sustaining measures decision in three right to die cases where the patients differed in competence; for half the subjects, a living will was present in all the cases, whereas, for the other half, it was not. Subjects also gave their determinative reasons for their decisions. Support for the right to die varied by case, but not by competency, or by the presence of a living will. The subjects' reasons were highly predictive of their decisions, and related to the way case-specific facts were construed, revealing a number of disparities between the way courts and citizens construe whether the patient's condition is ''terminal,'' ''irreversible,'' and ''painful,'' or not. Beyond construing facts differently, the results also revealed a disparity between evolving case law and the community's ''common sense justice'' over a fundamental belief. whether dying is seen as private matter, outside the bounds of State intervention, or not.