WAGES AS SORTING MECHANISMS IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION - A THEORY OF TESTING

被引：37

作者：

GUASCH, JL ^{[1
]}

WEISS, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] BELL TEL LABS INC,MURRAY HILL,NJ 07974

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2296934

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：653 / 664

页数：12

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