It was Wittgenstein's pragmatist, The pragmatists are Wittgensteinian, or neither one thing nor the other?: On rules, truths and social actions

There is an apparent contradiction between, on the one hand, the great distance that Ludwig Wittgenstein saw between his own philosophical aspirations and the pragmatists' purposes and, on the other hand, the proximity that recently has been developed between Wittgenstein-influenced thought and (neo) pragmatism. In order to shed some light on such an inconsistency, we will deal in this paper with Wittgenstein reflections on rules (i.e. on normativity), and with the ideas of some pragmatist authors on this very topic. This way we will be able to test if there is a real congruency or a sharp disagreement (or simply a 'family resemblance', if we are allowed to use this multifaceted expression in this context) between the philosophical project of Wittgenstein and the pragmatists' project. The main goal of this paper, though, is not simply an exegesis of the true intentions of Wittgenstein or some pragmatist philosophers (if this were so, we would fall into the 'intentionalist fallacy' that both Wittgenstein and pragmatism clearly reject). The main goal of this paper is to ascertain which philosophical thesis on rationality are more reasonable: the stereotypical pragmatist's ideas (that Wittgenstein plainly discarded), or Wittgenstein allegedly antiphilosophical position, or the much more balanced stances defended by neopragmatists.