IT TAKES 2 TO TANGO - EQUILIBRIA IN A MODEL OF SALES

被引：77

作者：

BAYE, MR

KOVENOCK, D

DEVRIES, CG

机构：

[1] PURDUE UNIV,DEPT ECON,W LAFAYETTE,IN 47907

[2] CATHOLIC UNIV LEUVEN,CTR ECON STUDIES,B-3000 LOUVAIN,BELGIUM

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1992年 / 4卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0899-8256(92)90033-O

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We show that the Varian model of sales with more than two firms has two types of equilibria: a unique symmetric equilibrium, and a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. In contrast, the 2-firm game has a unique equilibrium that is symmetric. For the n-firm case the asymmetric equilibria imply mixed strategies that can be ranked by first-order stochastic dominance. This enables one to rule out asymmetric equilibria on economic grounds by constructing a metagame in which both firms and consumers are players. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this metagame is symmetric. © 1992.

引用

页码：493 / 510

页数：18

共 13 条

[1]

BAGNOLI M, 1986, EQUILIBRIUM UNINFORM

[2]

BAYE MR, 1990, 9051 TILB U CTR WORK

[3] THE EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM IN DISCONTINUOUS ECONOMIC GAMES .1. THEORY [J].