IT TAKES 2 TO TANGO - EQUILIBRIA IN A MODEL OF SALES

被引：77
作者：
BAYE, MR
KOVENOCK, D
DEVRIES, CG
机构：
[1] PURDUE UNIV,DEPT ECON,W LAFAYETTE,IN 47907
[2] CATHOLIC UNIV LEUVEN,CTR ECON STUDIES,B-3000 LOUVAIN,BELGIUM
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1992年 / 4卷 / 04期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0899-8256(92)90033-O
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We show that the Varian model of sales with more than two firms has two types of equilibria: a unique symmetric equilibrium, and a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. In contrast, the 2-firm game has a unique equilibrium that is symmetric. For the n-firm case the asymmetric equilibria imply mixed strategies that can be ranked by first-order stochastic dominance. This enables one to rule out asymmetric equilibria on economic grounds by constructing a metagame in which both firms and consumers are players. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this metagame is symmetric. © 1992.
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页码：493 / 510
页数：18
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