The debate on heuristics. A dispute over the criteria of good reasoning between the Heuristic Tradition and Bias and Ecological Rationality

In this paper I argue that the central problem behind the debate between Daniel Kahneman and Gerd Gigerenzer regarding the role of heuristic reasoning in our comprehension of human rationality is the way in which we characterize normative reasoning. To this end, I show how, in the recent literature about heuristic reasoning, a sharp distinction has been drawn -in certain cases, even an opposition-between formal and heuristic reasoning. I argue that the discussion has focused on which one of these kinds of reasoning should be taken as the right model of our reasoning. I show that this point may be tracked by analyzing the texts of George Polya and Herbert A. Simon. This analysis will allow us to notice the relevance of said debate, which has, often times, been considered a mere semantic dispute.