Multilateral bargaining with imperfect information

被引：16

作者：

Baliga, S ^{[1
]}

Serrano, R ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] BROWN UNIV,DEPT ECON,PROVIDENCE,RI 02912

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1995年 / 67卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.1995.1087

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study a multilateral procedure in which responders are told only their own shares. The proposal becomes common knowledge after the response stags and responders have optimistic beliefs after off-equilibrium offers. When discounting is high, the set of equilibrium agreements is a singleton; when it is low. there is a large multiplicity of equilibrium payoffs. In contrast to earlier work, our multiple equilibria are constructed by using strategy profiles in which a responder rejects any offer that reduces his or her own share. (C) 1995 Academic Press Inc.

引用

页码：578 / 589

页数：12