US farmers' insurance choices under budget heuristics

被引:5
作者
Bulut, Harun [1 ]
机构
[1] NCIS, Overland Pk, KS 66210 USA
关键词
Agricultural (crop and livestock) insurance; Budget heuristics; Cumulative prospect theory; Mental accounting; Revealed preferences (GARP);
D O I
10.1108/AFR-02-2017-0009
中图分类号
F3 [农业经济];
学科分类号
0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;
摘要
Purpose - Regional differences in crop insurance uptake have persisted over time. To partly explain this phenomenon, the purpose of this paper is to propose and evaluate a budget constraint (heuristic) effect within the standard expected utility theory (EUT) framework through simulation methods. Design/methodology/approach - Within the EUT framework, a standard simulation model is used to gain insights into farm insurance decisions when a budget constraint is in effect. The budget constraint is modeled as it has been revealed through the data on farmers' insurance expenditures. In the simulation analysis, certainty equivalent values are used to rank farm options subject to the revealed budget constraint. Findings - A budget constraint effect within the EUT framework stands out in explaining the observed regional differences. The proposed explanation is consistent with the historical trends on the ratio of crop insurance expenditure to expected crop value, higher premium rates in regions with lower crop insurance uptake, and the limited turnout for the 2014 Farm Bill's supplemental area-based crop insurance products. Farmers' crop insurance choices are found to be mostly constrained-optimal. Originality/value - This appears to be the first study taking the revealed preferences approach to farmers' crop insurance choices in a simulation analysis. Some policy implications are drawn and future research avenues are suggested. The findings should be of considerable value to policymakers, academics, bankers, and producers in regard to the design and use of risk management tools.
引用
收藏
页码:152 / 172
页数:21
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