THE EFFECTS OF COMMUNICATION AND COMMITMENT IN A PUBLIC-GOODS SOCIAL DILEMMA

A social dilemma is a situation in which members of a group are faced with a conflict between maximizing personal interests and maximizing collective interests. Communication among the members of a group has been shown to enhance cooperation (maximize groups interests); it was hypothesized that if members are allowed to make a pledge prior to their actual decision, they can communicate their intentions and hence increase the cooperation rate. Two experiments were conducted in which several types of pledge conditions were contrasted with a ''no-pledge'' (control) condition. As hypothesized, the results indicate that a pledge enhanced cooperation. However, the degree of commitment required in the pledge differentially affected the cooperation rate. The results are interpreted in terms of a two-stage dilemma in which members can coordinate their expectations only if some degree of commitment is required in their pledge. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.