Shareholder Bargaining Power, Debt Overhang, and Investment

被引：14

作者：

Alanis, Emmanuel ^{[1
]}

Chava, Sudheer ^{[2
]}

Kumar, Praveen ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Texas State Univ, San Marcos, TX 78666 USA

[2] Georgia Inst Technol, Atlanta, GA 30332 USA

[3] Univ Houston, Houston, TX 77004 USA

来源：

REVIEW OF CORPORATE FINANCE STUDIES | 2018年 / 7卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1093/rcfs/cfy005

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Using a dynamic model of strategic bargaining between equity and debt holders following default, we analyze the impact of shareholder bargaining power and debt overhang on optimal investment and strategic default. Our empirical tests utilize a new measure of the debt overhang wedge based on default probabilities generated from a hazard model for bankruptcy. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, bondholder (shareholder) ownership concentration ceteris paribus enhances (weakens) the overhang wedge and dampens (increases) capital investment. We identify novel ownership-structure-related factors in firm-level capital investment and document how post-default shareholder bargaining power alleviates the underinvestment problem caused by debt overhang.

引用

页码：276 / 318

页数：43

共 85 条

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