THE CORE OF A GAME WITH A CONTINUUM OF PLAYERS AND FINITE COALITIONS - THE MODEL AND SOME RESULTS

被引:48
作者
KANEKO, M
WOODERS, MH
机构
[1] UNIV TORONTO,DEPT ECON,TORONTO M5S 1A1,ONTARIO,CANADA
[2] UNIV MINNESOTA,ZENTRUM MATH,MINNEAPOLIS,MN 55455
[3] UNIV TSUKUBA,SAKURA,IBARAKI 30031,JAPAN
[4] YALE UNIV,COWLES FDN,NEW HAVEN,CT 06520
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0165-4896(86)90032-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:105 / 137
页数:33
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