INTERFIRM RIVALRY IN A REPEATED GAME - AN EMPIRICAL-TEST OF TACIT COLLUSION

被引：77
作者：
SLADE, ME
机构：
来源：
JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS | 1987年 / 35卷 / 04期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/2098585
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
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页码：499 / 516
页数：18
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