Endogenous formation of free trade agreements in vertically related markets

被引：6

作者：

Kawabata, Yasushi ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Nagoya City Univ, Grad Sch Econ, Mizuho Ku, 1 Yamanohata,Mizuho Cho, Nagoya, Aichi 4678501, Japan

来源：

RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS | 2015年 / 69卷 / 02期

关键词：

Free trade agreement; Vertically related markets; Hub and spoke agreement; Multilateral free trade;

D O I：

10.1016/j.rie.2015.03.001

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study the endogenous formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) in a symmetric three-country model with vertically related markets characterized by Cournot competition. We analyze the coalition-proof Nash equilibria in an FTA formation game in which each country forms an FTA with one, both, or none of its trading partners. We show that multilateral free trade is the unique stable equilibrium of the FTA formation game. In other words, FTAs act as building blocks for multilateral trade liberalization in the presence of vertical trade structures. (C) 2015 University of Venice. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved,

引用

页码：214 / 223

页数：10

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