ON AN INFORMATION-THEORETIC MODEL OF EXPLANATION

[1] Ayala FJ., 1982, POPULATION EVOLUTION

[2] Blalock H.M., 1964, CAUSAL INFERENCE NON

[3] CAUSAL INFERENCES, CLOSED POPULATIONS, AND MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1967, 61 (01) : 130 - 136

[4] FETZER JH, 1981, SCI KNOWLEDGE

[5] EXPLANATIONS, TESTS, UNITY AND NECESSITY [J]. NOUS, 1980, 14 (01): : 31 - 50

[6] GOLDBERG S, 1983, PROBABILITY SOCIAL S

[7] GREENO J, 1971, PHILOS SCI, V37, P279

[8] GREENO J, 1970, PSA 1970, P3

[9] TRANSMITTED INFORMATION AS A MEASURE OF EXPLANATORY POWER [J]. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 1978, 45 (04) : 531 - 562

[10] MAXIMAL SPECIFICITY AND LAWLIKENESS IN PROBABILISTIC EXPLANATION [J]. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 1968, 35 (02) : 116 - 133

[1] Ayala FJ., 1982, POPULATION EVOLUTION

[2] Blalock H.M., 1964, CAUSAL INFERENCE NON

[3] CAUSAL INFERENCES, CLOSED POPULATIONS, AND MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1967, 61 (01) : 130 - 136

[4] FETZER JH, 1981, SCI KNOWLEDGE

[5] EXPLANATIONS, TESTS, UNITY AND NECESSITY [J]. NOUS, 1980, 14 (01): : 31 - 50

[6] GOLDBERG S, 1983, PROBABILITY SOCIAL S

[7] GREENO J, 1971, PHILOS SCI, V37, P279

[8] GREENO J, 1970, PSA 1970, P3

[9] TRANSMITTED INFORMATION AS A MEASURE OF EXPLANATORY POWER [J]. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 1978, 45 (04) : 531 - 562

[10] MAXIMAL SPECIFICITY AND LAWLIKENESS IN PROBABILISTIC EXPLANATION [J]. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 1968, 35 (02) : 116 - 133