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ON THE TOURNAMENT EQUILIBRIUM SET
被引:14
作者
:
DUTTA, B
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, New Dehli, 110016
DUTTA, B
机构
:
[1]
Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, New Dehli, 110016
来源
:
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
|
1990年
/ 7卷
/ 04期
关键词
:
D O I
:
10.1007/BF01376285
中图分类号
:
F [经济];
学科分类号
:
02 ;
摘要
:
An example is provided showing that Schwartz's tournament equilibrium set is not identical to the minimal covering set of Dutta. © 1990 Springer-Verlag.
引用
收藏
页码:381 / 383
页数:3
相关论文
共 5 条
[1]
BANKS JS, 1985, SOC CHOICE WELFARE, V4, P295
[2]
COVERING SETS AND A NEW CONDORCET CHOICE CORRESPONDENCE
[J].
DUTTA, B
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
DUTTA, B
.
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY,
1988,
44
(01)
:63
-80
[3]
CONDORCET SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS
[J].
FISHBURN, PC
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
PENN STATE UNIV,COLL BUSINESS ADM,UNIVERSITY PK,PA 16802
PENN STATE UNIV,COLL BUSINESS ADM,UNIVERSITY PK,PA 16802
FISHBURN, PC
.
SIAM JOURNAL ON APPLIED MATHEMATICS,
1977,
33
(03)
:469
-489
[4]
NEW SOLUTION SET FOR TOURNAMENTS AND MAJORITY VOTING - FURTHER GRAPH-THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE THEORY OF VOTING
[J].
MILLER, NR
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
MILLER, NR
.
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
1980,
24
(01)
:68
-96
[5]
CYCLIC TOURNAMENTS AND COOPERATIVE MAJORITY VOTING - A SOLUTION
[J].
SCHWARTZ, T
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
Department of Political Science, UCLA, Los Angeles, 90024-1472, CA
SCHWARTZ, T
.
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE,
1990,
7
(01)
:19
-29
←
1
→
共 5 条
[1]
BANKS JS, 1985, SOC CHOICE WELFARE, V4, P295
[2]
COVERING SETS AND A NEW CONDORCET CHOICE CORRESPONDENCE
[J].
DUTTA, B
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
DUTTA, B
.
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY,
1988,
44
(01)
:63
-80
[3]
CONDORCET SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS
[J].
FISHBURN, PC
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
PENN STATE UNIV,COLL BUSINESS ADM,UNIVERSITY PK,PA 16802
PENN STATE UNIV,COLL BUSINESS ADM,UNIVERSITY PK,PA 16802
FISHBURN, PC
.
SIAM JOURNAL ON APPLIED MATHEMATICS,
1977,
33
(03)
:469
-489
[4]
NEW SOLUTION SET FOR TOURNAMENTS AND MAJORITY VOTING - FURTHER GRAPH-THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE THEORY OF VOTING
[J].
MILLER, NR
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
MILLER, NR
.
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
1980,
24
(01)
:68
-96
[5]
CYCLIC TOURNAMENTS AND COOPERATIVE MAJORITY VOTING - A SOLUTION
[J].
SCHWARTZ, T
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
Department of Political Science, UCLA, Los Angeles, 90024-1472, CA
SCHWARTZ, T
.
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE,
1990,
7
(01)
:19
-29
←
1
→