Is there a self-enforcing monetary constitution?

被引:17
|
作者
Salter, Alexander William [1 ]
机构
[1] George Mason Univ, Dept Econ, MSN 3G4,4400 Univ Dr, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
关键词
Central banking; Constitutional political economy; Free banking; Monetary constitution; NGDP targeting; Robust political economy;
D O I
10.1007/s10602-014-9163-1
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
A self-enforcing monetary constitution has rules that agents acting within the system will uphold even in the presence of deviations from ideal knowledge and complete benevolence. It thus does not require external enforcement. What would such a constitution look like? I show that two regimes-a version of nominal gross domestic product targeting that relies on market implementation of monetary policy, and free banking-meet these requirements for self-enforcing monetary constitutions. The analysis draws insights from political economy, and from constitutional political economy in particular.
引用
收藏
页码:280 / 300
页数:21
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