Stock Repurchase as a Takeover Defense

被引：32

作者：

Bagnoli, Mark ^{[1
]}

Gordon, Roger ^{[1
]}

Lipman, Barton L. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA

[2] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA

来源：

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 1989年 / 2卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1093/rfs/2.3.423

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We develop a model in which stock repurchases serve as a defence against takeovers by signaling the manager's private information about the value of the firm. the manager repurchases shares to block a takeover only if the cost of doing so is not too high. Since the cost is inversely related to the value of the firm under his management, a repurchase signals that the value of the stock is high, blocking a takeover. While a repurchase increases the expected value of the stock, it also makes the stock riskier. The model also implies that there are too few takeovers for efficiency.

引用

页码：423 / 443

页数：21

共 21 条

[1] Successful Takeovers without Exclusion [J].